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NASA’s IV&V Program
IV&V Program
• NASA’s Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) Program reports to the Office of Safety and Mission 
Assurance (OSMA)
• Technically, Managerially, and Financially Independent
• Located in Fairmont, West Virginia
• NASA IV&V employs systems engineering processes
and rigorous methodologies for evaluating the 
correctness and quality of software products on
NASA’s highest profile missions
• NASA IV&V goal: Add evidence-based assurance that
minimizes the overall risk of NASA mission software
• Full Lifecycle • In Phase
• Mission Oriented
• Capability Based
• Product Focused
• Risk Driven
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NASA’s Artemis Program
IV&V Program
National Aeronautics and Space Administration IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II 4
Artemis IV&V
IV&V Program
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Challenges
• NASA IV&V executes analysis on software artifacts, but in order to communicate effectively with 
stakeholders, we make assurance statements about mission capabilities
• Differences in planning and execution between the individual IV&V project teams introduced 
challenges
• Risk assessment and prioritization approach was only loosely shared; analysis target 
priorities did not always line up across teams
• Aggregation of assurance conclusions did not always result in a cohesive message across 
project teams
• Gaps in assurance, particularly with respect to system and software integration, were difficult to 
identify and address
• Assurance data is difficult to objectively quantify, and our tooling approach made it difficult to 
manage, track, and keep our qualitative data up-to-date
IV&V Program
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Artemis II Mission Overview
IV&V Program
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Solutioning
• The IV&V project teams gathered for a Process Development Kaizen (PDK) Lean event
• Problem Statement:  Our Artemis IV&V projects operate as independent 
projects. The projects’ outputs are varied in some form and make it difficult to 
communicate across projects, roll-up assurance to the mission level, and 
prioritize work and resources across projects. This approach results in 
numerous process inefficiencies and variation in the deliverables with Artemis 
IV&V. 
• Primary Objective: For Artemis II and beyond,
determine an Artemis-wide workflow to support
scoping, performing, capturing and reporting
assurance analysis independent of mission.
• Primary output was an Implementation Plan
identifying three further process development
initiatives, as well as further requests from
IV&V leadership
IV&V Program
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Assurance Cases
• An assurance case is a structured 
argument
• The GSN syntax provides a graphical 
notation for documenting an assurance 
case that supports scalability
• IV&V realized that we can build an 
assurance case that captures:
• The decomposition of capabilities 
down to software 
components/functions
• The strategy IV&V employs in 
planning analysis
• The evidence captured as a result 
of analysis
• We still needed a way to build in a risk 
assessment layer over top of the 
assurance case to determine which 
branches should be in focus
IV&V Program
Source:  GSN Community Standard (Version 2)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II 9
Implementation
Assurance Architecture Focus Group
Objective:  Develop the process and 
determine the tooling by which Artemis IV&V 
will develop and maintain the Assurance 
Case
Additional Goals:
• Lay out the first few levels of claims in the 
Artemis Assurance Case
• Map existing assurance architecture from 
Artemis I into the new Assurance Case
• Identify training needs
IV&V Program
Risk Assessment Team
Objective:  Develop the process and criteria 
by which all Artemis IV&V teams will conduct 
risk assessments for prioritizing at each level 
of decomposition
Additional Goals:
• Support selection of risk criteria and 
scoring with relevant industry research
• Validate the choice of criteria with a 
scoping/prioritization exercise based on 
Artemis I data
• Define an appropriate cadence to revisit 
risk assessments
Pilot Team
Objective:  Test the approaches developed by 
the other two teams in an actual IV&V 
assurance case development exercise
Additional Goals:
• Test the utility of the assurance case for 
“roll-up” of assurance and communication
• Identify and develop new work 
instructions for operating with the 
assurance case
• Collect lessons learned for use in training 
other team members
1. Assurance Design
• Decompose Assurance 
Cases
• Assess Risk
• Repeat
2. Analysis Planning
• Review Assurance 
Goal(s)
• Identify Necessary 
Evidence
• Plan an Analysis 
Approach
3. Analysis Execution
• Gather Artifacts
• Apply Analysis 
Methods
• Collect Evidence
4. Reporting and Tracking
• Communicate Results
• Review Progress
• Plan Priorities
• Hold Retrospectives
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The Experience Thus Far
Benefits
• The Lean event had the immediate effect of 
increasing cross-team communication, 
which continues almost a year later
• Establishing an Artemis IV&V Program has 
begun synchronizing planning and 
execution across all of the project teams
• The Artemis assurance case has made it 
easier to see the integration points where 
additional risk could exist
• Analysts have found building the assurance 
case to be an intuitive activity that helps 
build their system understanding
IV&V Program
Drawbacks
• New training necessary to teach analysts 
how to build and use the assurance case
• A single tool solution that supports our 
process and requirements (esp. for multi-
user platform) does not yet exist
• Growing pains across the Artemis team as 
analysts adapt to these new methods of 
planning and executing their work
• Building the assurance case requires 
additional effort to formally represent the 
assurance design
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Looking Ahead
• Stepping up adoption and use of the Artemis assurance case from ~10 analysts (currently) to the 
whole Artemis IV&V team (~85 analysts) 
• Integrating the assurance case with our other tools
• Simultaneous development of assurance cases for Artemis II and III
• Migrating evidence and assurance from previous Artemis I assurance design constructs into the 
Artemis assurance case
• Building external communication and reporting features using the assurance case and toolchain
• Maintaining continuous improvement activities across the entire Artemis team
IV&V Program
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Questions?
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